We consider situations where liability yields insu¢ cient incentives to control risks, e.g., parties are not always sued for harm done or are unable to pay fully for it. Some potential injurers nevertheless take appropriate precautions because of intrinsic prosocial concerns. Others have no such concerns but would like people to believe that they do. We show that the negligence rule is more e¤ective than strict liability at transforming social image concerns into incentives to exert care. When evidence about care is imperfect, the rules of proof a¤ect the inferences drawn from court decisions and therefore the stigma attached to a negligence ruling. If inadequate care is a rare event, plainti¤s should bear the burden of proving the defendant's negligence; otherwise there are cases where defendants should bear the burden of proving compliance with due care. Under either assignment of the burden of proof, incentives to comply are maximized by a standard of proof stronger than a mere preponderance of evidence. KEYWORDS: Normative motivations, prosocial behavior, strict liability, negligence, burden of proof, standard of proof. (JEL: D8, K4, Z13)
Introduction
In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith remarks that an individual found to have caused harm faces not only the possibility of a legal sanction -e.g., the damages he must pay -but also social disapproval or stigma.
The Law and Economics literature has studied stigma mainly in relation to criminal activity (Rasmusen 1996 , Harel and Clement 2007 , Zasu 2007 , among others). We inquire how a concern for social approval interacts with the incentives created by tort law and how this a¤ects the relative performance of di¤erent legal regimes.
We consider the unilateral accident model when the strict liability and negligence rules yield insu¢ cient incentives to control risks. Injurers are partially judgment-proof or are not always sued, e.g., it is not always feasible to prove harm or identify the injurer. Some potential injurers are nevertheless assumed to exert socially e¢ cient care. They do so out of intrinsic moral or prosocial concerns. Other injurers have no such concerns but would like people to believe that they do; that is, they care about social approval. For instance, in a recent experimental study on liability rules (Angelova et al. A basic result its that the negligence rule is more e¤ective than strict liability in harnessing reputational concerns. The reason is simply that trial outcomes are then more informative. Under strict liability, an adverse ruling merely ascertains that the defendant caused harm, not that he took inadequate precautions. Under the negligence rule, a liability ruling also ascertains that the defendant exerted inadequate care, thereby providing more precise information about his intrinsic predispositions. Socially useful incentives are therefore derived from the signaling role of "fault" or "negligence".
To further explore this possibility, we extend the analysis to imperfect evidence about a defendant's precautions. A complete characterization of the negligence regime must now consider how courts deal with the risk of judicial error. The legal tools for this purpose are the assignment of the burden of proof -whether it is for the plainti¤ to prove the defendant's negligence or for the defendant to prove compliance with due care -and the standard of proof that needs to be satis…ed by the party with the burden of proof. The burden of proof assignment and the standard of proof a¤ect the inferences drawn from trial outcomes; that is, they bear on the "meaning" or "signi…cance"of a ruling of negligence. We show that when injurers have social image concerns, and by contrast with the results in Fluet (2006, 2008) , compliance with due care is maximized by a standard of proof stronger than the common law preponderance of evidence standard.
Roughly speaking, the assignment of the burden of proof depends on whether inadequate care is a frequent or infrequent event. In the usual case where harm seldom occurs, incentives to comply with due care are maximized by assigning to the plainti¤ the burden of proving the defendant's noncompliance.
A recent microeconomic literature has emphasized that one's actions may signal something about unobservable predispositions and that some predis- The focus of that paper is the extent to which formal legal sanctions crowdout or crowd-in informal motivations under di¤erent liability rules. 2 In the present paper, we also compare liability rules but the emphasis is in providing prescriptions about the law of evidence under evidentiary uncertainty. 
The model
We start with a simple version of the unilateral accident model. Risk-neutral individuals are engaged in a socially valuable activity which may impose an accidental loss of amount L on third parties. The risk of causing harm depends on the potential injurer's level of care which is e = 0 for low (or no)
care and e = 1 for high care respectively. The probability of accident is p(0) = p l and p(1) = p h where p l > p h > 0. The opportunity cost of low care is normalized to zero, that of high care is c distributed according to the Social welfare is maximized if, depending on the circumstances, injurers choose the level of care minimizing the sum of precaution costs and of expected harm. When the cost of care is c, the socially e¢ cient level of care minimizes ce + p(e)L. It is therefore
where c is the critical cost level below which high care should be exerted.
Liability. We consider situations where liability does not always ensure socially e¢ cient precautions. First, injurers are sued for harm done only with some probability q. Secondly, injurers may not be able to pay fully for the harm they cause, i.e., the legal damages they will actually pay if found liable is min(w; L) where w denotes the injurers' assets. 3 It is well known that, by contrast with strict liability, the negligence rule may then nevertheless induce e¢ cient care. The following assumption rules out this possibility.
Any combination of q and w satisfying the assumption is su¢ cient for our purpose. Consider the strict liability rule. Injurers must then in principle pay for the harm they cause irrespective of circumstances. However, because he is not always sued or cannot pay fully for harm done, an individual with cost of care c exerts high care only if c q(p l p h ) min(w; L). Given Assumption 1, there are therefore circumstances where individuals will take inadequate precautions.
Under the negligence rule, courts are assumed to observe ex post the cost c which the defendant faced and to set due care at the socially e¢ cient 3 A similar set-up is employed in Shavell (1984) to analyze the joint use of liability and regulation. Note that the cost of care is implicitly assumed to be non-pecuniary.
level. Accordingly, an indidual faces a risk of liability only when he exerts low care and c c (p l p h )L. Because of the dilution of incentives due to the chance of not being sued or to partial judgment-proofness, the injurer complies with due care only if c p l q min(w; L). Again, given Assumption 1, there will be circumstances where precautions are inadequate, although ine¢ cient care will be less frequent than under strict liability. See Figure   1 . Note that for the time being we abstract from the possibility of judicial error.
Figure 1. Ine¢ ciencies
Social preferences. So far we have described the standard framework where the injurers'behavior depends only on private costs and bene…ts as conventionally de…ned. We now consider informal motivations. We assume that there are two types of potential injurers. First, some potential injurers are "good citizens"with prosocial predispositions. They seek to behave in a socially or morally responsible manner by comparing their opportunity cost of care with the expected harm they impose on others. 4 Such individuals, referred to as type = 1, choose the socially e¢ cient level of care irrespective of legal legal sanctions, i.e., they exert high care when c c and low care
otherwise. There is a known proportion of such individuals.
Secondly, individuals who are thought to be intrinsically prosocial earn social esteem, a source of utility. For those individuals who are not prosocial, referred to as type = 0, behavior is determined by the utility function u = w n + I where w n is net …nal wealth, is a positive parameter and I E( j I) is the belief of society at large about the individual's type conditional on the information I. Given our de…nition of types, I is simply the posterior probability that the individual is intrinsically prosocial and I is the utility derived by the individual from society's beliefs about his intrinsic predispositions.
An individual's type is private information. For society at large, so is the cost of care he faced, his chosen level of care and whether he caused harm, except insofar as these can be inferred from court judgments. Speci…cally, the only information "publicly" available about an individual -that is, in society at large -is either B for "bad news" or G for "good news". Bad news refers to the case where the individual is known to have been found liable under the prevailing liability rule. Good news is the complementary event.
The meaning of good and bad news therefore depends on the liability regime. Under strict liability, B means that the individual caused harm, was subsequently sued (which arises only with probability q) and held liable.
Under the negligence rule, B means that the individual caused harm, was sued and held liable, hence was found to have been negligent. In the case of a suit under the negligence rule, the court is assumed to observe the cost of care faced by the defendant and the level of care he exerted. Hence it can determine whether the defendant was negligent. However, society at large is only informed of adverse trial outcomes, i.e., the general public has no time for details.
Strict Liability versus Negligence
By assumption prosocial individuals always take adequate precautions, so we only need to examine the behavior of the non prosocial. Let (e; c) denote the probability that an individual is found liable given that he caused harm and is sued. The probability is determined by the liability rule and may depend on the defendant's level of care and the circumstances. Under strict liability, (e; c) = 1 irrespective of care and of circumstances. Under the negligence rule, (e; c) = 1 if e = 0 and c c and is otherwise zero.
Incentives. Given the cost of care c, the expected utility of a non prosocial as a function of his care level is
where B and G are society's beliefs about the individual's type conditional on "bad" and "good" news respectively. These beliefs are determined at equilibrium but are taken as given by the individual. It is easily seen that the individual exerts high care if and only if
where G B will be referred to as the reputational penalty from an adverse court judgment.
Under the strict liability rule, the condition (2) reduces to
The right-hand side is the critical cost below wich a non prosocial exerts high care under the strict liability rule (the subscript S refers to strict liability).
The critical cost level is written as a function of the reputational penalty yet to be determined. 
where the right-hand side is the critical cost below which a non prosocial exerts high care under the negligence rule (hence the subsript N ). Observe that under the negligence rule the critical cost cannot be above the e¢ cient threshold c .
The proportion of the non prosocial exerting high care is G(c r ) where c r is the critical cost level under the liability rule r = S; N . It will be useful to focus instead on the ratio, denoted y, of the population of non prosocial exerting high care over those who should be exerting high care.
This ratio will be referred to as the compliance rate and is de…ned by y G(c r )=G(c ). From the above discussion, the compliance rate is a function of the reputational penalty and satis…es
When the reputational penalty is nil, the compliance rate is the same as would be observed in the standard model without social preferences. Recall that Assumption 1 then ensures that S (0) < N (0) < 1. Under strict liability, the compliance rate is increasing in the reputational penalty (as long as c N ( ) is less than the upper bound c). For a su¢ ciently large penalty, overcompliance (i.e., y > 1) is consistent with (3) and (5), although this will never arise at equilibrium as shown below. Under the negligence rule, the compliance rate is also increasing in the reputational penalty, but only up to the socially e¢ cient compliance rate y = 1.
Beliefs. We now turn to the determination of the reputational penalty.
Using Bayes'rule, the beliefs G and B under a given liability rule -and therefore the reputational penalty -can be expressed as a function of the compliance rate.
Given the compliance rate y, the reputational penalty sati…es = ' r (y), r = S; N . Under strict liability,
Under the negligence rule
Both ' S (y) and ' N (y) are strictly decreasing functions, with ' S (y) < ' N (y)
Note that p is the average probability of accident when all the non prosocial exert the socially appropriate level of care. For a given compliance rate and restricting attention to y 1, the reputational penalty is smaller under strict liability because an adverse adverse judgment provides noisier information about the individual's intrinsic predispositions. Under the negligence rule, bad news reveals perfectly that the injurer is non prosocial, hence B = 0. Under strict liability, this only becomes more likely so.
When all injurers exert e¢ cient care (i.e., when y = 1), bad and good news provide no information at all under strict liability. The prosocial and non prosocial then behave the same. Because they face the same probability of an adverse judgment, the updated beliefs do not di¤er from the prior, i.e., B = G = . By contrast, when all individuals comply with due care under the negligence rule, good news is uninformative ( G = ) because it occurs with certainty, but bad news would remain perfectly revealing ( B = 0). 5 Finally, the fact that ' S (y) and ' N (y) are strictly decreasing functions may be interpreted in terms of strategic substitutability. Everything else 5 Bad news is then an out-of-equilibrium event with zero probablity, hence B cannot be computed using Bayes'rule. The reputational penalty is then equal, when more individuals exert e¢ cient care the reputational penalty decreases, hence the incentive to avoid an adverse judgment becomes smaller. Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a compliance rate and a reputational penalty that simultaneously solve y = r ( ) and = ' r (y). Denote an equilibrium by E r = (y r ; r ). Figure 2 provides an example for both the strict liability and negligence rules. Figure 3 provides yet another example with a larger , i.e., the non prosocial care more about social approval. The …gure illustrates the case where is large enough for everyone to comply with due care under the negligence rule. 6 The next proposition summarizes the main properties of the equilibria. (ii) y S and y N are increasing in w, q or ; S and N are decreasing in w and ;
(iii) N and y N are increasing in ; S and y S are increasing (decreasing) in when is small (large).
Part (i) states that, in terms of providing incentives to exert e¢ cient care, the negligence rule always does better than strict liability. In particular, the negligence rule deters optimally if esteem concerns are strong enough, while strict liability always underdeters. Part (ii) states that relaxing the sources of ine¢ ciency, i.e., increasing the probability of suit or reducing the extent of judgment-proofness, increases compliance although there may be some "motivational crowding-out" (i.e., the reputational penalty may decrease).
Similarly, a greater concern for social image improves compliance. Due to esteem concerns, there is an externality between prosocial individuals and the behavior of the non prosocial. Part (iii) considers whether the externality has greater force the greater the number of prosocial individuals. Under the negligence rule, a greater proportion of virtuous individuals shifts the ' N curve upwards and therefore induces a greater number of the non prosocial 6 The condition is p l q[min(w; L) + ] c .
to exert e¢ cient care. Under strict liability, the e¤ect is ambiguous: if the proportion of virtuous individuals is su¢ ciently small, more of them shifts the ' S curve upwards, thereby increasing deterrence; the opposite obtains when the proportion of virtuous individuals is su¢ ciently large. Figure   4 . Under strict liability, the equilibrium is (y S ; S ) = (1; 0); that is, an adverse court judgment imposes no reputational penalty, implying that the non prosocial are now motivated solely by formal legal incentives. Under the negligence rule, the equilibrium is (y N ; N ) = (1; ). Although having been found negligent would impose a reputational penalty, the incentives provided by reputational concerns are now super ‡uous with respect to inducing compliance with due care, by contrast with the case illustrated in Figure 3 .
Judicial Error under the Negligence Rule
The above analysis shows that the negligence rule is more e¢ cient at transforming the externality due to social image concerns into incentives to exert socially appropriate care. As noted, the reason is that trial outcomes are more informative about a defendant's behavior and therefore about his intrinsic predispositions. It is not clear, however, whether the negligence rule would remain more e¢ cient if its greater informational requirements cannot be met perfectly. To address this issue, we extend our analysis of the negligence rule to the case where trial outcomes are noisy signals. Speci…cally, we assume that the evidence about the injurers'behavior is not perfectly informative, so that can courts make mistakes in assessing whether the defendant complied with due care. They can erroneously rule against the defendant (referred to as a "false positive" or type I error) or erroneously rule against the plainti¤ (a "false negative" or type II error).
The possibility of judicial error implies that the negligence rule will have elements of strict liability. Moreover, a complete description of the negligence rule must now take into account how the judicial system trades-o¤ type I and type II errors. Di¤erent trade-o¤s de…ne di¤erent legal regimes.
In practice, the trade-o¤ is determined by the prevailing rules of proof, by which me mean the burden of proof assignment and the standard of proof.
The party with the burden of proof needs to persuade the court that he is entitled to a judgment in his favor, otherwise the default decision is that he looses the case. The standard of proof refers to the weight of evidence needed to discharge the burden.
Burden and standard of proof. Because accidents occur more often under low care, the mere occurrence of harm provides some information about the injurer's behavior. Any additional information that might be used to assess behavior is summarized by the random variable x with cumulative distribution functions F h (x) and F l (x) that depend on the defendant's level of care. The distributions have continuously di¤erentiable density functions, denoted f h (x) and f l (x), and the same support [x; x] where the bounds need not be …nite. The "invariant support" condition means that no realization x perfectly reveals the defendant's care level.
The distributions satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP)
with the convention that a small value of x is more indicative of low care.
The condition that f l =f h goes from in…nity to zero means that extreme values are tantamount to perfectly informative evidence. 7 The plainti¤ has the burden of proving the occurrence of harm and the injurer's identity. As before, this can either be done without ambiguity (with probability q) or not at all. When this requirement is satis…ed, a suit is feasible. Both the plainti¤ and the defendant are then assumed to have access to the additional evidence x about the injurer's behavior, as well as to perfect evidence concerning the circumstances c faced by the defendant. 
where k is the standard of proof that the plainti¤ must satisfy to discharge the burden. The expression on the left-hand side is the likelihood ratio of low care versus high care on the part of the defendant, given the evidence "occurrence of harm and x". Condition (6) states that the plainti¤ must adduce evidence showing that inadequate care is k times more likely than due care.
(ii) If the injurer bears the burden of proving that he complied with due care, he avoids liability only if he can submit x such that
The interpretation is similar except that the left-hand side is now the relative likelihood of high versus low care. To escape liability, the defendant must show that compliance with due care is k times more likely than non compliance.
Note that court rulings are assumed to be based purely on the evidence pertaining to the particular case before the court. The rationale is that rulings are independent of the "priors"the court may hold about the general prevalence of high care among the population of injurers with cost of care c.
The contested issue is the particular defendant's actions. Both in common law and in civil law, priors in the form of a "known" (e.g., at equilibrium)
proportion of injurers exerting high care would not be considered as relevant or admissible evidence. 8 We consider standards of proof satisfying k 1. The case k = 1 is the common law preponderance of evidence standard. For the party with the burden of proof, it then su¢ ces to show that the relevant evidence gives greater weight to his contention, however slightly; that is, the party with the burden of proof need only prove his claim on a "more likely than not" basis. A threshold k > 1 means a stronger standard. For instance, it is sometimes said that k = 3 roughly conveys the standard of clear and convincing evidence (see Schauer and Zeckhauser 1996) . The liability risk di¤erential. Let b x be the evidentiary threshold for some assignment of the burden and some standard of proof. Conditional on the occurrence of harm and a suit being …led, the probability that the injurer will be found liable is j F j (b x) depending on his care level j = h; l.
When the injurer complied with due care, the probability of a type I error is h ; when he exerted inadequate care, the probability of a type II error is 1 a l . For any evidentiary threshold, the monotone likelihood ratio property implies that h < l except when the threshold is at the bounds of the support, in which case the equality holds. Ex ante, given the possibility of court error, the liability risk di¤erential between low and high care is
It is useful to express l as a function of the type
Lemma 2 l ( h ) is strictly concave with l (0) = 0, l (1) = 1 and
Written as a function of the type I error, the liability risk di¤erential is
and is therefore concave in h . Figure 6 provides an illustration. Observe that the di¤erential is zero when h = 0 and that it is equivalent to the one under strict liability when h = 1, except for the fact that injurers now escape liability when c is above c .
Lemma 3
Under Assumption 2, ( h ) has a strict interior maximum at
The lemma states that, irrespective of the burden of proof assignment, the liability risk di¤erential is maximized if courts decide the case on the basis of the preponderance of evidence standard of proof. Assigning the burden of proof to the plainti¤ (resp. the defendant) and using a standard of proof stronger than preponderance would yield a type I error smaller (resp. larger) than E h .
1 0 
Compliance Maximizing Negligence Rules
We now consider how to design the rules of proof in order to maximize incentives to comply with due care. From the preceding section, a liability regime can be summarized by the type I error h in rulings of negligence.
Bad news and good news are de…ned as before.
Replicating the approach in Section 3, it is easily seen that a non prosocial individual with cost of care c now exerts high care if and only if
The interpretation is the same as for the condition (4) of Section 3. The critical cost below which an individual exerts high care is now written as a function of the rules of proof. 9 Similarly, the compliance rate now satis…es
As before, the function is strictly increasing in the reputational penalty (as long as y < 1).
Clearly, when the non prosocial have no social image concerns (i.e., = 0), N ( ; h ) does not depend on the reputational penalty and therefore compliance is maximized by maximizing the liability risk di¤erential, thus by setting h = E h . 10 When social image matters, however, there is an additional consideration because the legal regime will also a¤ect the reputational penalty.
Lemma 4
Under the negligence regime with type I error h , the reputational penalty satis…es = ' N (y; h ) where
The function is decreasing in y with ' N (1; h ) = 0.
For a given negligence regime h , an equilibrium is a solution to y = N ( ; h ) and = ' N (y; h ). As before, the solution is unique. We denote the equilibrium by E N ( h ) = (y N ( h ); N ( h )). Choosing the best liability regime from a deterrence point of view requires maximizing y N ( h ) with respect to its argument. Let us …rst de…ne
The expression is the proportion of individuals found liable under the negligence regime h when the rate of compliance is y. At equilibrium under the regime h , the proportion of individuals found negligent is ( h ; y N ( h )).
1 0 The rate of compliance would be smaller than under perfect evidenve because
where the right-hand side is the liability risk di¤erential without judicial error. As is well known, judicial error reduces incentives (see Polinsky and Shavell 1989 ).
We will say that …nding negligence is a rare event if the proportion of individuals found negligent is less than one half; conversely, it is a frequent event if the proportion is greater than one half. We can now state the following.
Proposition 2 Suppose the negligence regime maximizes compliance with due care. Then the plainti¤ bears the burden of proving negligence (resp. the defendant bears the burden of proving compliance with due care) if …nding negligence is a rare (resp. frequent) event. In either case the standard of proof is stronger than preponderance of evidence.
The intuition is a simple one. Suppose h is compliance maximizing.
Consider a marginal increase in the type I error; that is, it now becomes easier for the plainti¤ to prove the defendant's negligence or it becomes more di¢ cult for the defendant to prove that he complied with due care.
Suppose this shifts the N curve to the right in the neighborhood of the equilibrium. Observe that this can arise only when h is below E h , the evidentiary threshold under the preponderance of evidence standard. In other words, the compliance maximizing regime is characterized by the plainti¤ bearing the burden of proof and by a standard of proof stronger than preponderance of evidence. If at the same time the ' N curve shifts upwards in a neighborhhod of the equilibrium, then h cannot have been compliance maximizing. Thus, it must be that the ' N curve shifts downwards, i.e., the optimal regime trades-o¤ the e¤ects on the liability risk di¤erential and on the reputational penalty. More generally, at a compliance maximizing regime, a small change in the type I error must have "opposite" e¤ects on the N and ' N curves. As shown in the Appendix, whether the ' N curve shifts upwards or downwards depends on the frequency of negligence rulings.
, maximizing compliance requires the plainti¤ to bear the burden of proving the defendant's negligence and to do so to a standard greater than preponderance of evidence.
pression in the corollary is an upper bound for the proportion of individuals found negligent under any negligence regime. Hence the condition follows trivially from Proposition 2. As a particular case, the condition is satis…ed when p l 1=2. Thus, when the occurrence of harm seldom arises even under low care, the plainti¤ should be assigned the burden of proof.
Su¢ cient conditions for the injurer to bear the burden of proof are not as straightforward to characterize. We describe one possible cae. Suppose q = 1 so that underdeterrence is solely due to the injurers'inability to pay fully for the harm done. Suppose further that c c so that G(c ) = 1,
i.e., high care is the due care standard in all circumstance. Let b y N be the equilibrium compliance rate when the evidence is perfectly informative as in It is easy to produce examples where this probability is larger than b N .
Concluding Remarks
Liability rulings do not have the same "social meaning"under strict liability as under the negligence rule. Under either rule, the meaning also di¤er depending on the proportion of virtuous individuals in the population of potential injurers and the extent to which formal legal sanctions underdeter.
When assessing a defendant's level of care is subject to error, the meaning of a …nding of negligence will also depend on the risk of type I and type II judicial errors and therefore on the rules of proof.
In most situations, accidental harm and legal suits will be rare events. A regime that seeks to maximize compliance with due care should then make it relatively di¢ cult to …nd negligence. This is achieved by assigning to the plainti¤ the burden of proving the defendant's negligence and imposing a standard of proof stronger than preponderance of evidence. The intuition is that, when suits are rare events, not …nding negligence is banal, i.e., posterior beliefs then do not di¤er much from the prior. By contrast, a …nding of negligence yields substantial disesteem. Making it harder still to …nd negligence increases the stigma and therefore the incentives to exert care. On the other hand, when the occurrence of harm and suits are frequent events, not being found negligent may provide signi…cant prestige. The reputational gain -hence the incentives to comply with the due carecan be increased by making it relatively di¢ cult to escape liability. The best regime is then one that imposes on the defendant the burden of proving that he complied with due care and to do so to a standard stronger than preponderance of evidence.
Our results are reminiscent of Bénabou and Tirole's (2011) discussion of how acceptable behavior arises from the interplay of "honor"and "stigma".
High stigma is attached to a behavior that "is just not done", i.e., only the worst type will do it. Alternatively, when "everyone does it", the same behavior carries little stigma. But then "not doing it" yields prestige. In the case of trial outcomes under the negligence rule, whether the …nding of negligence imposes signi…cant "stigma"or whether not …nding negligence confers signi…cant "honor"depends on the underlying situation, but to some extent can also be in ‡uenced by the liability regime for the purpose of increasing incentives to comply with due care.
